Article 75 – Signature and entry into force

Article 75 – Signature and entry into force

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by the member States of the Council of Europe, the non-member States which have participated in its elaboration and the European Union.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on which 10 signatories, including at least eight member States of the Council of Europe, have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.
4. In respect of any State referred to in paragraph 1 or the European Union, which subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Glossary of Key Terms

Ratification: The formal act by which a state confirms its consent to be bound by a treaty after signing it. Ratification typically requires approval by the state’s legislature or other constitutional process, followed by deposit of an “instrument of ratification” with the treaty depositary. Distinct from signature alone, which expresses preliminary agreement but does not create binding obligations.

Convention: A formal agreement or treaty between states, typically establishing legal obligations under international law. In this context, refers to the Istanbul Convention (Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence). Once ratified or acceded to, conventions create binding legal obligations for state parties.

Entry into force: The date when a treaty becomes legally binding on the states that have ratified or acceded to it. This term is notably vague – it does not specify what “force” means, what enforcement mechanisms exist, or what practical effects follow from this legal status. The Convention specifies different entry into force dates: (1) for the Convention as a whole after 10 ratifications (Article 75), and (2) for individual states three months after depositing their instrument of ratification (Article 75(4)).

Monitoring / Oversight: Diplomatic euphemisms for international interference in domestic affairs. When used in the context of GREVIO (the Convention’s monitoring body), these terms describe foreign officials conducting country visits, demanding domestic data, evaluating national laws, issuing public reports criticizing state practices, and pressuring governments to change their legal systems. Local law enforcement agencies, family groups, and domestic constituencies may view this “monitoring” as unwanted foreign interference in sovereign matters that should be handled by local institutions accountable to their own populations.

Weaknesses Assessed 2025 11m 14d by Dainis W. Michel, Claude.ai, and ChatGPT

Structural Function

Article 75 is a procedural gateway clause. It determines:

• Who may sign (Council of Europe member states, certain non-members that participated in drafting, and the EU)
• What constitutes binding consent (ratification, acceptance, approval)
• When the Convention becomes operational (after a threshold number of ratifications)
• Entry into force timing for later ratifiers

Key Observations

1. Controlled but Broad Eligibility

Article 75 allows:

• All CoE member states
• Non-member states only if they participated in drafting
• The European Union as a supranational actor

This already signals a dual-level sovereignty interplay — individual states and the EU may each bind themselves. For EU members, this can create a layered legal effect where both EU-wide and national obligations run in parallel.

2. Binding Through Formal Instruments Only

No informal political commitment suffices. A state becomes bound solely through one of:

• Ratification
• Acceptance
• Approval

This clarifies that:

• Parliamentary systems must go through internal constitutional steps
• Governments cannot “half-commit” via political declarations

This is good treaty hygiene — but it also establishes a rigid threshold with no flexibility for partial participation.

3. Entry Into Force Trigger is Collective, Not Individual

The Convention enters into force only when:

• 10 signatories,
• including at least 8 CoE member states,
• complete ratification.

This creates:

• A collective dependency — even if a state is ready early, the Convention cannot take effect until others join
• A political bottleneck built into the treaty architecture
• Potential for delayed implementation if key states drag their feet

4. Later Ratifiers Enter on a Delay

For any later state (or the EU):

• The Convention enters into force 3 months after the instrument is deposited

This delay is standard, but it also means:

• States have no way to accelerate or slow their own entry
• The treaty applies based on a fixed calendar constraint, not domestic readiness
• No flexibility for phased implementation or pilot programs

Weaknesses / Sovereignty Considerations

1. EU Double-Binding Effect

Because both states and the EU can ratify, EU member states may face:

• Obligations from their own ratification plus
• Obligations imposed indirectly through EU-level acceptance

Practical effects:

• If the EU ratifies, all EU member states become subject to EU-level enforcement mechanisms
• National parliaments may ratify, but then EU institutions can impose additional requirements
• Creates dual accountability – both to GREVIO (Convention monitoring) and to EU institutions
• EU member states cannot opt out of provisions the EU accepts, even if they entered reservations nationally

Example: An EU member state might enter a reservation under Article 78(2) regarding Article 59 (residence status for migrant victims). But if the EU ratifies without that reservation, the state may still face EU-level pressure to implement Article 59 fully, effectively overriding its reservation.

2. Rigid Entry Mechanism

No state can enter partly, gradually, or in a phased manner. This is an all-or-nothing accession moment.

• Cannot adopt prevention measures (Chapter III) first, then add criminal law provisions later
• Cannot implement support services (Chapter IV) while delaying consent-based rape definition (Article 36)
• Cannot phase in GREVIO monitoring – it applies immediately upon entry into force
• Cannot test Convention implementation in pilot regions before national rollout

This contrasts with:

• EU law, which sometimes allows transition periods for new obligations
• Optional protocols, which allow states to accept additional obligations when ready
• Framework conventions, which set general principles but allow flexible implementation timelines

3. Dependency on Other States

A country cannot bring the Convention into force until others make the same choice. This creates external influence over a state’s internal legal timetable.

Historical example: The Convention was adopted in 2011 but didn’t enter into force until August 1, 2014 – more than three years later. States that ratified early (Albania: November 2012, Portugal: January 2013) had to wait for others before the Convention took effect, even though they were ready to implement.

This means:

• Early ratifiers cannot immediately trigger Convention mechanisms (cooperation requirements, GREVIO monitoring and oversight) even if they wished to implement early
• Domestic constituencies supporting or opposing the Convention must wait for foreign governments’ decisions
• Political momentum (whether for or against ratification) can be lost during the waiting period
• States that object to the Convention can delay implementation for everyone by refusing to ratify

4. No Provisional Application Option

Some treaties allow provisional application before full ratification. This one does not. A state is either fully in, or fully out.

• Cannot provisionally apply non-controversial provisions while debating controversial ones
• Cannot test Convention implementation before making binding commitment
• Cannot voluntarily comply with Convention standards before ratification to demonstrate good faith

Contrast with: Many trade agreements and EU association agreements allow provisional application of certain provisions before full ratification, enabling states to begin cooperation immediately.

Critical Analysis: Structural Control Mechanisms

1. Who Controls the Gateway?

Article 75(1) limits signature to:

• CoE member states – controlled by CoE membership rules
• Non-members “which have participated in its elaboration” – controlled by who was invited to drafting sessions
• The EU – a unique supranational participant

This means the Council of Europe controls the initial gateway. States not invited to participate in elaboration cannot sign under Article 75 – they must go through the even more restrictive Article 76 accession process requiring unanimous consent.

2. The “8 CoE Members” Threshold

Article 75(3) requires at least 8 Council of Europe member states among the 10 signatories needed for entry into force. This means:

• CoE member states have privileged status – Convention cannot enter force based on non-member ratifications alone
• Maintains Convention as primarily a European instrument, not a universal one
• Non-member participants’ ratifications alone are insufficient to trigger entry into force

3. Three-Month Waiting Periods

Both Article 75(3) and 75(4) impose 3-month waiting periods:

• After the 10th ratification, wait 3 months for initial entry into force
• After each subsequent ratification, wait 3 months for that state’s entry into force

Justification: Allows time for administrative preparations, translation, notification to other parties.

Weakness: Inflexible – no acceleration for urgent situations, no delay if a state needs more time. Creates identical timeline for states with vastly different capacities and readiness levels.

Comparison Across Articles 75-78

Article	Function	Key Control Mechanism	Flexibility
75	Initial signature & entry into force	CoE controls eligibility; collective threshold for entry	None – all or nothing
76	Later accession by non-participants	Unanimous consent of all existing Parties required	None – pure gatekeeping
77	Territorial application	States control which territories are bound	High – selective inclusion/exclusion
78	Reservations	Limited permitted reservations only	Very low – most provisions non-reservable

Summary of Article 75 Weaknesses

1. All-or-Nothing Structure

• No partial adoption
• No phased implementation
• No provisional application
• No pilot programs

2. External Dependencies

• Cannot enter into force individually
• Tied to decisions of other states
• No control over implementation timeline

3. Dual-Layer EU Complications

• Both EU and member states can ratify
• Creates overlapping obligations
• Potential for conflicting interpretations
• Can override national reservations

4. Controlled Access

• CoE determines initial eligibility
• Non-participants face Article 76 barriers
• Maintains European dominance

CRITICAL: Fundamental Definitional Failures States Bind Themselves To

Article 75 requires states to ratify a Convention built on undefined and incoherent foundational terms:

1. “Gender” Defined Without Biology – Article 3(c) Fatal Flaw

When states sign and ratify under Article 75, they bind themselves to Article 3(c)’s definition of “gender” as: “the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men”

What this definition deliberately excludes:

• NO mention of biological sex
• NO reference to genetics (chromosomes, DNA)
• NO reference to anatomy or reproductive system
• NO acknowledgment that “women” and “men” are material, biological categories

Real-world consequences of ratifying this definition:

• Males in women’s prisons: Male inmates claiming to “identify” as women transferred to women’s facilities, assaulting female prisoners
• Males in women’s shelters: Article 23 requires “shelters” for women – but males who self-identify can demand access, creating danger for traumatized abuse survivors
• Males in rape crisis centers: Article 25 requires “rape crisis or sexual violence referral centres” – males claiming to be women can work there or access services, traumatizing female victims
• Males in women’s sports: The Convention’s equality framework (Articles 4, 6) is used to justify males competing as “women,” destroying female athletic achievement
• Erasure of sex-based protections: All Convention provisions protecting “women” become incoherent when “women” can include any male who claims to be one

Article 75 ratification implications:

• States bind themselves to enforce self-identification – biological sex becomes legally irrelevant across all Convention provisions
• No provisional application to test impact – Article 75 allows no gradual adoption to observe consequences
• All-or-nothing structure – states cannot ratify while preserving sex-based protections for women
• Parliamentary systems may not understand – legislatures voting on ratification may not realize they’re erasing biological sex as a legal category
• Three-month automatic entry – once ratified, Convention enters force in three months with no ability to delay if problems emerge

The EU double-bind: EU member states face an additional trap – if the EU ratifies under Article 75(1), individual member states may be bound to the gender self-identification framework even if their own ratification included reservations or clarifications.

2. “Violence” Never Defined – Ratifying a Blank Check

The Convention’s title is “Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence” yet the Convention NEVER defines what “violence” means.

What states ratify instead of a definition:

• “Harm” – undefined, infinitely expandable
• “Suffering” – subjective, no threshold provided
• “Violation” – no legal standard

Article 3(a) provides this circular non-definition:

“violence against women” is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women”

Analyzing what states bind themselves to:

• “Likely to result in” – criminalizes conduct based on speculation about potential future emotional reactions
• “Psychological harm” – includes any negative emotional response? Disagreement? Criticism? Unpopular opinions?
• “Economic harm” – includes normal financial decisions? Choosing not to provide support? Business decisions?
• “Suffering” – entirely subjective perception with no objective measure
• “Violation” – of what? By whose standard?

How bad actors exploit ratification of undefined terms:

• Weaponizing ordinary conflicts: Any interpersonal disagreement becomes “psychological violence”
• Criminalizing speech: Expressing views someone dislikes becomes “creating an intimidating environment” (Article 40)
• Economic manipulation: Normal financial decisions (divorce settlements, inheritance, business choices) recast as “economic violence”
• False accusations: Undefined terms enable accusers to criminalize any conduct by labeling it “harmful” or causing “suffering”
• Perpetual expansion: Each year GREVIO can expand what qualifies as “violence” with no limiting principle

Article 75 ratification implications:

• States ratify criminal prohibitions without knowing what conduct is prohibited – a fundamental violation of rule of law
• Legislatures approve vague language thinking it means physical assault, not realizing it criminalizes speech and economic decisions
• Three-month implementation deadline – after ratification, states have only three months before undefined terms become enforceable
• GREVIO gains interpretive power – an unelected international body defines what conduct constitutes “violence” with no appeal
• No ability to test provisions – Article 75 allows no provisional application to observe how undefined terms will be exploited
• Rigid formal instruments required – states cannot informally adopt clear definitions before formal ratification

3. The Ratification Trap: Binding Without Understanding

Article 75’s structure creates a trap where:

• Formal instruments only (paragraph 2): No informal process to clarify definitions before binding ratification
• Collective entry into force (paragraph 3): Early ratifiers cannot implement until others join, delaying discovery of definitional problems
• Fixed three-month delay (paragraph 4): Once ratified, implementation is automatic with no time to address discovered flaws
• All-or-nothing commitment: Cannot ratify clear provisions while rejecting undefined ones

What states actually sign and ratify:

• A Convention that doesn’t define “violence”
• A definition of “women” based on subjective self-identification
• Criminal prohibitions (Articles 33-40) built on undefined “harm,” “suffering,” and “violation”
• Support services (Articles 20-26) for a category of people (women) the Convention refuses to biologically define
• GREVIO monitoring (Chapter IX) with unlimited discretion to interpret undefined terms
• Limited reservations (Article 78) that do NOT permit reserving on the definitional failures

4. Why Definitional Failures Matter More Due to Article 75 Structure

Controlled Eligibility (paragraph 1):

• Only CoE members and invited non-members can sign – ensures only states that won’t demand definitional clarity participate
• Gatekeeps out states that would insist on biological definitions and legal precision

Binding Through Formal Instruments Only (paragraph 2):

• No informal commitment period to test definitions
• Ratification immediately binds to undefined terms
• No provisional application to observe consequences of erasing sex and defining violence subjectively

Collective Entry Into Force (paragraph 3):

• Early ratifiers cannot implement until 10 states ratify – delays discovery of definitional problems
• By the time Convention enters force, multiple states are already bound
• Difficult for states to withdraw once others have relied on their ratification for entry into force

EU Participation (paragraph 1):

• EU can ratify alongside member states, creating dual obligations
• EU-level ratification of undefined terms can override member state attempts to maintain definitional clarity
• Member states lose control over whether their legal systems must adopt gender self-identification and undefined “violence”

5. The Parliamentary Trap: Legislators Ratifying What They Don’t Understand

Article 75’s formal ratification requirement means national parliaments vote on ratification without:

• Understanding that “gender” means self-identification, not biological sex
• Realizing that “violence” is never actually defined
• Knowing that “harm” and “suffering” are infinitely expandable
• Recognizing that males will claim access to women’s spaces under the Convention
• Comprehending that criminal laws will be based on undefined terms
• Appreciating that GREVIO will interpret vague language with unchecked discretion

Legislators think they’re voting to:

• Protect women from physical assault and rape
• Provide services to female victims of male violence
• Criminalize serious domestic abuse

They’re actually voting to:

• Erase biological sex as a legal category
• Criminalize subjectively defined “psychological harm” and “suffering”
• Allow males into women’s prisons, shelters, and rape crisis centers
• Grant an international body unlimited power to define “violence”
• Bind their country to obligations that contradict their own constitutional protections

Article 75’s rigid structure prevents:

• Provisional application to test the definitions
• Phased implementation to observe consequences
• Partial adoption of clear provisions while rejecting unclear ones
• Withdrawal of ratification if problems emerge during the 3-month waiting period

Conclusion: Article 75 requires states to formally bind themselves through ratification to undefined “violence,” ideologically-driven “gender,” and limitless “harm” and “suffering” – with no ability to test, delay, or partially adopt clear provisions while rejecting incoherent ones.

Questions for Further Analysis

• How did the 3-year delay between adoption (2011) and entry into force (2014) affect implementation in early-ratifying states?
• Have EU member states faced conflicts between national reservations and EU-level commitments?
• Could a state challenge the collective entry-into-force threshold as an unreasonable restraint on treaty participation?
• Why does the Convention require 8 CoE members specifically, rather than simply 10 total ratifications regardless of source?
• Has the all-or-nothing structure deterred states that would accept most but not all provisions?
• What happens if the EU ratifies provisions that conflict with member states’ constitutional requirements?
• Could Article 75’s eligibility restrictions be challenged as discriminatory under general international law principles?

Conclusion

Article 75 establishes a rigid, collective, and controlled entry mechanism that:

• Limits initial participation to CoE members and invited non-members
• Requires collective action for entry into force, not individual readiness
• Imposes fixed timelines regardless of state capacity
• Creates dual-layer obligations for EU member states
• Allows no flexibility for partial or phased implementation

These structural choices reflect a treaty designed for a closed community of like-minded European states, not a universal human rights instrument open to all.